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INTRODUCTION
When Stockton, California, a city of just under 300,000 people,
filed for Chapter 9 protection on June 28, 2012,1 it became the largest
U.S. city by population to do so.2 Like other municipalities, Stockton
has been greatly affected by the collapse of the sub-prime lending
market from 2007 to 2008.3
Stockton, however, was
disproportionately affected because of its location in the Central
Valley region of California, an attractive location for those who want
to live near the Bay area, with one out of every thirty homes in
foreclosure.4 The high foreclosure rate, coupled with declining home
values, has decreased Stockton’s tax revenue from property taxes.5
Because of this decrease in tax revenue, the city has had difficulties
repaying obligations to creditors as they become due.6 In order to
meet its obligations, Stockton has been forced to cut the services it
provides to citizens to the bare minimum required to maintain the
city.7 Although Stockton has been ranked as the second most
dangerous city in California, second only to Oakland, and one of the
ten most dangerous cities in America, it has had to slash its police
force by twenty-five percent to cut costs.8 Stockton was also named

1. Chapter 9 Voluntary Petition at 1, In re City of Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 1.
2. See Nate Berg, The 7 Biggest Cities Ever to File for Bankruptcy, ATLANTIC
CITIES (June 27, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/06/7biggest-cities-file-bankruptcy/2397/; Stockton (City), California, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/0675000.html (last updated June
27, 2013). Detroit, Michigan filed for Chapter 9 protection on July 18, 2013,
supplanting Stockton as the largest city by population to file for bankruptcy. Monica
Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles Into Insolvency,
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-forbankruptcy.html?hp&_r=0.
3. See generally FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
MARKET: NATIONAL AND TWELFTH DISTRICT DEVELOPMENTS (2007), available at
http://www.frbsf.org/files/2007annualreport.pdf.
4. Les Christie, California Cities Fill Top 10 Foreclosure List, CNN MONEY
(Aug. 14, 2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/14/real_estate/California_cities_lead_
foreclosure/index.htm.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Malia Wollan, Years of Unraveling, Then Bankruptcy for a City, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/us/years-of-unraveling-thenbankruptcy-for-a-city.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
8. Id.; America’s 10 Most Dangerous Cities, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.
com/2300-504083_162-10007941.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
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America’s most miserable city by Forbes in 2011.9 Citizens who are
able to leave the city are doing so as a result, sending Stockton into a
downward spiral with even more decreases in revenue from property
taxes.10 After rounds of failed negotiations with creditors, required by
Section 53760 of the California Government Code, Stockton filed for
Chapter 9 protection to solve its fiscal crisis.11 The California Public
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), a state executive agency
that manages pension and health benefits for California’s public
employees, retirees, and their families,12 is Stockton’s largest creditor,
with a contingent, unliquidated claim of over $147 million.13 This
obligation is an obstacle to a city that is trying to provide for its
citizens, meet other debt obligations, and maintain some form of
credit in order to borrow in the future.
The story of Stockton is not unlike that of many other U.S. cities.
Municipalities have mounting obligations as a result of providing
services, building infrastructure, paying payroll, and contributing to
benefits for city employees.14 The economic recession and collapse of
real estate values reduced the tax base and tax revenues generated at
the local level with lower property values translating to decreased
property taxes.15 The result is a lower municipal income and tighter
budget constraints.16 The high foreclosure rate reduces the value of
the property foreclosed upon and that of surrounding properties.
There is also less federal funding to states, which means less state
funding for municipalities. Some municipalities operate on shortterm financing, borrowing money in the form of bonds in order to pay
for current obligations.17 These municipalities need to continuously

9. Kurt Badenhausen, America’s Most Miserable Cities, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/2011/02/02/stockton-miami-cleveland-business-washingtonmiserable-cities.html.
10. Wollan, supra note 7.
11. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53760, 53760.3 (West 2012).
12. CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYS., FACTS AT A GLANCE (2012),
available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/general.pdf.
13. List of Creditors Holding 20 Largest Unsecured Claims at 1, In re City of
Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 4.
14. See generally Will Hueske, Chapter 9 Update: Alabama Municipalities
Eligible as “Debtors” Under 109(c), WEIL BANKR. BLOG (May 22, 2012),
http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter-9/chapter-9-update-alabamamunicipalities-eligible-as-debtors-under-section-109c.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See Michael Corkery & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, New Hit to Strapped States—
Borrowing Costs Up as Bond Flops; Refinancing Crunch Nears, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,
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borrow money in order to meet those obligations.18 When credit
froze, these municipalities defaulted on their obligations, which in
turn caused additional cross-defaults on other credit obligations.19
Public pension plan obligations are an increasing problem for
municipalities with large deficits.20 Public employees are promised
more in their retirement plans than the municipalities can afford to
pay.21 Pension plans have been underfunded in the last couple of
years because estimated rates of return on pension plan investments
have been significantly higher than actual returns.22 Municipalities
typically promise public employees defined-benefit plans, where
employees are promised certain specific benefits upon retirement.23
The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) has provided
general standards for accounting and financial reporting that most
state and local government plans follow.24
However, median
investment return for public pension funds was negative 24.91% in
2008.25 The aggregate market value of state and local government
pension funds dropped from $3.2 trillion in 2006 to just $2.3 trillion as
of October 31, 2008.26 This chronic underfunding, coupled with
demographic pressures like increased life expectancies and pension
envy, where public sector employees generally expect larger pensions
than their private sector counterparts, has contributed to the
mounting pension obligations of many municipalities.

2011, at A1 (reporting on the elevated rates municipalities are being forced to pay to
issue debt).
18. See generally id.
19. Hueske, supra note 14.
20. See Jeffrey Ellman & Daniel Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can
Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 365, 368–69 (2011).
21. See id. at 368.
22. Id. at 369.
23. See id. at 374.
24. See generally GOV’T ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY OF STATEMENT NO.
25: FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND NOTE
DISCLOSURES FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (1994), available at http://
www.gasb.org/st/summary/gstsm25.html; GOV’T ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY
OF STATEMENT NO. 27: ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS BY STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (1994), available at http://www.gasb.org/st/summary/
gstsm27.html.
25. STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS DIRECT, STANDARD & POOR’S, MARKET
DECLINES WILL SHAKE UP U.S. STATE PENSION FUND STABILITY 2 (2009).
26. Jonathan Barry Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 837, 850–51 (2009).
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Part I of this Note provides background information on Chapter 927
of the Bankruptcy Code, treatment of private sector pension plans
under Chapter 11, and the differences between Chapter 9 and
Chapter 11 as they relate to pension obligations. This Note then
examines the conflicts presented by various state law perspectives on
the nature of pension plans and their ability to be modified, whether a
pension plan is an executory contract, and federalism issues regarding
treatment of prepetition breach of contract claims. This Note then
argues that in jurisdictions such as California, where public
employees’ rights under pension plans are viewed as contractual
rights, pension plans may be rejected as executory contracts, pursuant
to § 365,28 as applied at a Chapter 9 municipal reorganization
proceeding. The extent to which rejection amounts to a modification
of pension plan obligations will depend upon the extent to which
these obligations have “vested” under federal law.
Thus,
municipalities may use the tools available in bankruptcy to reorganize
debt and better provide for their constituencies going forward.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 9 AND PENSIONS IN CHAPTER 11
GENERALLY
Since Chapter 9 bankruptcies are so rare, there is little case law on
treatment of pensions in Chapter 9. Chapter 9, a reorganization
chapter, adopts many of the provisions available in a chapter 11
bankruptcy, also a reorganization chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.29
As such, an analysis of treatment of pensions in chapter 11 is
necessary to analogize what may happen in chapter 9 bankruptcies,
taking into account the differences between the two chapters. Here,
this Note discusses Chapter 9 bankruptcies generally, how pensions
are treated in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, what makes treatment of
pensions in Chapter 9 more complicated than treatment of pensions
in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, and why California is the focus of this
Note.

27. In this Note, whenever a chapter is listed, it refers to a chapter in the
Bankruptcy Code.
28. In this Note, whenever a section is listed, it refers to 11 U.S.C., the
Bankruptcy Code.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (listing sections of the Bankruptcy Code that apply
to Chapter 9 bankruptcies and including provisions of Chapter 11).
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A. Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Generally
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code allows municipalities to
reorganize their debts.30 It provides municipalities in financialdistress protection from creditors while it develops and negotiates a
plan for readjusting its debts. This reorganization typically involves
extending debt maturities, reducing the principal or interest rates of
loans, and refinancing existing debt.31
Chapter 9 is different from other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code,
in that some provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply.32 Only
those sections listed in § 901 apply to Chapter 9 bankruptcies, while
all provisions of Chapters 1, 3, and 5 apply to bankruptcies under
Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.33 In the context of
pension modification, Chapter 11 reorganizations have specific
provisions that govern rejection of collective bargaining agreements
and treatment of retiree health benefits.34 Sections 1113 and 1114,
which discuss collective bargaining agreements and retiree health
benefits, respectively, might otherwise govern in a Chapter 9
reorganization, but neither is listed as an applicable provision under §
901.35 Section 362, however, does apply to Chapter 9 bankruptcies,
giving municipalities the benefit of the automatic stay while it

30. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–46 (2012).
31. See, e.g., Chapter 9 Plan Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts
Filed by Debtor The City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, In re City of Central Falls,
R.I., No. 11-13105 (Bankr. D.R.I. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 479.
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (specifically listing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
that apply and omitting those that do not).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 901 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Sections 301, 333, 344, 347(b), 349, 350(b)[,] 351[,] 361, 362, 364(c),
364(d), 364(e), 364(f), 365, 366, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506, 507(a)(2), 509, 510,
524(a)(1), 524(a)(2), 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549(a), 549(c), 549(d), 550, 551,
552, 553, 555, 556, 557, 559, 560, 561, 562, 1102, 1103, 1109, 1111(b), 1122,
1123(a)(1), 1123(a)(2), 1123(a)(3), 1123(a)(4), 1123(a)(5), 1123(b), 1123(d),
1124, 1125, 1126(a), 1126(b), 1126(c), 1126(e), 1126(f), 1126(g), 1127(d),
1128, 1129(a)(2), 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(6), 1129(a)(8), 1129(a)(10),
1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A), 1129(b)(2)(B), 1142(b), 1143, 1144, and 1145 of
this title apply in a case under this chapter.
Id.
34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1114 (2012).
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (not listing §§ 1113 and 1114 as applicable sections
under Chapter 9).
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attempts to negotiate with creditors.36 Section 365 also applies, which
allows the debtor to assume or reject executory contracts.37
There are two significant sources of limitations in Chapter 9 that
differentiate Chapter 9 from other sections of the Bankruptcy Code: a
municipality cannot liquidate and dissolve in bankruptcy, and there
are constitutional limits of the bankruptcy court’s power.38 Giving the
Bankruptcy Court the power to approve and manage a liquidation
and dissolution would be a violation of the Tenth Amendment’s
protection to states of sovereignty over their internal affairs.39 States
can dictate whether their municipalities seek Chapter 9 bankruptcy
protection.40 An unauthorized municipality is ineligible for relief.41 It
is through the requirement of state authorization that Chapter 9
satisfies the requirements of federalism. Through these means, the
federal government’s interests in financially sound municipalities are
balanced against states’ sovereign authority over its municipalities.
Section 109 governs eligibility for Chapter 9.42 Under § 109, an
entity must be (1) a municipality, (2) authorized by statute by the
state where the municipality is located, (3) that is insolvent and (4)
desires to affect a plan to adjust such debts, and (5) (A) has obtained
the agreement of impaired classes of creditors; (B) has failed to
obtain the agreement of impaired classes of creditors after good faith
negotiations; (C) cannot negotiate with creditors because such
negotiation is impracticable; or (D) believes that a creditor may
attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under § 547.43 The
second requirement under § 109, that a state statute specifically
authorizes the municipality to enter Chapter 9, allows states to act as
gatekeepers as to whether and which municipalities can file for
Chapter 9 protection.44 States vary in their approach to this
36. Id. Section 362 is listed under § 901 as a provision that applies in Chapter 9.
Section 362 governs the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012). Section 365 is listed under § 901 as a provision that
applies in chapter 9. Section 365 governs the executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. § 365
(2012).
38. See Lee Bogdanoff, Understanding Chapter 9 in Today’s Economic
Environment, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 49 (Jo Alice Darden ed.,
2011) (noting that the bankruptcy court cannot convert a Chapter 9 case into a
Chapter 7 liquidation case).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. In re City of Vallejo, Cal. 403 B.R. 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009).
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provision.45 Some states preclude access to Chapter 9 for all
municipalities within their jurisdiction; others broadly permit access
to Chapter 9.46 Twenty-three states do not provide access to Chapter
9.47 Of these twenty-three states, twenty-one do not have statutes
allowing municipalities in the state to file for Chapter 9 protection,
while Georgia and Iowa explicitly deny access to Chapter 9 by
statute.48 Some states condition eligibility, providing that only those
municipalities meeting specified requirements can file for bankruptcy

45. Transcript of Proceedings (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) (Trial
Volume IV) at 575, In re City of Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June
28, 2012), ECF No. 898.
46. Id. (“Now, that raises a number of possibilities in various states around the
country in their gatekeeping function, and this is what gives the states the power to
control whether Chapter 9 cases are filed, have a number of alternatives. For
example, in the State of Rhode Island, which recently went through the case of
Central Falls, Rhode Island, the state-mandated procedure was that there was a
receiver in charge of the city that came in, had the authority to throw out the city
council, the mayor, run the city, and have all the deals that could be made. And that
receiver had authority to file a Chapter 9 case if the receiver concluded that Chapter
9 was necessary for him to accomplish his mission, and that’s what happened. So
that’s an example of somebody empowered by state law to authorize an entity to
file.”).
47. CORY EUCALITTO ET AL., STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS, MUNICIPAL
BANKRUPTCY: AN OVERVIEW FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS 7 (2013), available at
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/doclib/20130301_SBSBankrupcyReport.pdf
(showing Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming as the twenty-one states without such statutes).
48. Id. Georgia law provides:
(a) No county, municipality, school district, authority, division,
instrumentality, political subdivision, or public body corporate created
under the Constitution or laws of this state shall be authorized to file a
petition for relief from payment of its debts as they mature or a petition for
composition of its debts under any federal statute providing for such relief
or composition or otherwise to take advantage of any federal statute
providing for the adjustment of debts of political subdivisions and public
agencies and instrumentalities.
(b) No chief executive, mayor, board of commissioners, city council, board
of trustees, or other governmental officer, governing body, or organization
shall be empowered to cause or authorize the filing by or on behalf of any
county, municipality, school district, authority, division, instrumentality,
political subdivision, or public body corporate created under the
Constitution or laws of this state of any petition for relief from payment of
its debts as they mature or a petition for composition of its debts under any
federal statute providing for such relief or composition or otherwise to take
advantage of any federal statute providing for the adjustment of debts of
political subdivisions and public agencies and instrumentalities.
GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2012).
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protection.49 Some states specifically authorize municipalities to file
for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection with no condition, but California
allows for broad, blanket authorization as long as one listed condition
applies.50 California is one of these states providing broad municipal
access to Chapter 9.51
The bankruptcy court’s power under Chapter 9 is more limited
than in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.52 The bankruptcy court is less
involved in the conduct and operation of the municipality in
bankruptcy, while a debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11
reorganization fully submits itself to bankruptcy court jurisdiction.53
Section 904 explicitly provides that a bankruptcy court may not
interfere with a municipality’s governmental powers, the property or
revenue of the debtor, or the debtor’s use of income-producing
property.54 A court also may not appoint a trustee or receiver to
oversee the affairs of the debtor in bankruptcy.55 In a Chapter 9 case,
49. For example, Pennsylvania prohibits Third-Class cities (population under
250,000 and not classified as Second Class A) from filing. In re City of Harrisburg,
Pa., 465 B.R. 744, 752–53 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (applying 72 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1601-D.1 (2013)); see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (outlining requirements for
classification as Second Class A). First-Class cities may file with the Governor’s
approval. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 12720.211. Second-Class cities may file with
Governor’s approval. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 28211. In Alabama, a municipality must
have bond debt in order to be eligible for Chapter 9. In re Jefferson Cnty. Ala., 469
B.R. 92, 98 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) (applying ALA. CODE 11-81-3 (LexisNexis
2008)).
50. EUCALITTO ET AL., supra note 47, at 7.
51. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760 (West 2013). Section 53760 provides:
A local public entity in this state may file a petition and exercise powers
pursuant to applicable federal bankruptcy law if either of the following
apply: (a) The local public entity has participated in a neutral evaluation
process pursuant to Section 53760.3[;] (b) The local public entity declares a
fiscal emergency and adopts a resolution by a majority vote of the governing
board pursuant to Section 53760.5.

Id.
52. See generally DEBT
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

ADJUSTMENTS FOR MUNICIPALITIES UNDER CHAPTER 9
§7[1] (Francis J. Lawall et al. eds., 2012).

53. See generally id.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) Section 904 provides:
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the
plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the
case or otherwise, interfere with—(1) any of the political or governmental
powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
(3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.

Id.
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (not incorporating § 1104 (appointment of a trustee)
into Chapter 9); see also Spellings v. Dewey, 122 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1941) (bankruptcy
court could not interfere in any manner with right of Arkansas drainage district
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a bankruptcy court’s power is limited to approving the petition,
confirming the plan, and ensuring that plan obligations are met.56 A
municipality in bankruptcy may manage itself while taking advantage
of the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions.57 In re Willacy County Water
Control & Improvement District No. 1 makes clear that the
bankruptcy court can only
determine insolvency or inability to meet debts as they mature, and
whether the plan proposed is in accordance with the provisions of
the statute, and whether it has been accepted by the number of
creditors provided, and whether the petitioner is in a position to
carry out the terms of the plan, and whether it is equitable, for the
best interests of the creditors, and nondiscriminatory.58

The court can only confirm the plan or dismiss the case based on its
answers to these questions.59 As such, much of the litigation
surrounding Chapter 9 cases involves the municipal debtor’s
The practical and
eligibility to seek Chapter 9 protection.60
constitutional limitations of Chapter 9 and differences between
Chapter 9 and other chapters of the Code lead to limited Chapter 9
filings.
B.

Treatment of Pensions in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

A pension plan is a scheme created by employers or an agency to
provide income for employees when they retire.61 There are generally
two types of pension plans: defined contribution plans and defined
benefit plans.62 In a defined contribution plan, the employer and
under Arkansas statutes to choose or remove its commissioners); In re N.Y.C. OffTrack Betting Corp., 434 B.R. 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (where New York law
was, at best, ambiguous regarding when off-track betting commissions must be paid
postpetition, preferable course was for the Chapter 9 bankruptcy court to abstain
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c), as political or governmental powers of debtor could not be
limited by court under § 904).
56. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
58. In re Willacy Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 36 F. Supp. 36,
39 (S.D. Tex. 1940).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., National Public Finance Guaranty Corporation’s Objection to the
City of Stockton’s Qualifications Under Sections 109(c) and 921(c) at 1–10, In re
Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 477 (seeking
dismissal of Stockton’s Chapter 9 case because of Stockton’s alleged failure to meet
the requirements stated in 109(c)).
61. See Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings, U.S. DEP’T LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
62. Id.
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employee may make contributions to the plan fund, “the employer’s
contribution is fixed[,] and the employee receives whatever level of
benefits the amount contributed on his behalf will provide.”63 “A
defined contribution plan ‘provides for an individual account for each
participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed
to the participant’s account.’”64 Since each individual in a defined
contribution pension plan is only entitled to payouts from the assets
dedicated to the individual account, there cannot be a deficiency of
funds in the plan to cover promised benefits.65 The United States
Code specifies that any pension plan that is not a defined contribution
plan is a defined benefit plan.66 A defined benefit plan “consists of a
general pool of assets rather than individual dedicated accounts.
Such a plan, ‘as its name implies, is one where the employee, upon
retirement, is entitled to a fixed periodic payment.’”67 In a defined
benefit plan, the asset pool may be funded by the employer, the
employee, or both.68 Although the employee may also make
contributions to the asset pool, the employer typically bears all of the
investment risk and usually bears any loss resulting from any
investment shortfall.69 On the other hand, if a defined benefit fund is
overfunded, the employer is permitted to reduce or suspend
contributions.70
Only defined benefit pension systems are affected in bankruptcy
because defined contribution pension systems are presumed to be
fully funded. Each individual in a defined contribution pension plan
is only entitled to payouts from the assets dedicated to the individual
account.71 Defined benefit pension systems can either be funded or

63. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439 (1999) (quoting Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 364 n.5 (1980)).
64. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006)).
65. Nachman Corp., 444 U.S. at 364 n.5.
66. 26 U.S.C. § 414(j) (2006).
67. Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at 439 (quoting Comm’r v. Keystone Consol.
Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 154 (1993)).
68. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c) (2006)).
69. See id. (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 232
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring); JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
LAW § 8:4 (1998)).
70. See Nachman, 444 U.S. at 363–64 n.5 (noting that “the employer’s
contribution is adjusted to whatever level is necessary” to provide the defined
benefits (internal quotation marks omitted)).
71. Id.

LAU_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1986

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

11/12/2013 11:17 PM

[Vol. XL

unfunded.72 A funded plan means the employer is contributing assets
that are invested.73 However, even some funded defined benefit
pension systems are underfunded as a result of overly ambitious
assumptions on investment returns and failure to fund pension plans
when the employer is strapped for cash.74 An unfunded pension plan
means that no assets are set aside and benefits are paid for by the
employer to the retiree as and when they are paid.75 This plan is
commonly referred to as a “pay-as-you-go” system.76 Funded and
unfunded plans are both affected in bankruptcy because funded plans
can be underfunded and unfunded plans are a problem when the
employer simply does not have the money to meet obligations.77
However, Chapter 11 only deals with underfunded plans78 because the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prohibits
unfunded, or pay-as-you-go plans.79 Both unfunded and underfunded
plans are at issue in Chapter 9.
Chapter 11 also distinguishes between vested and unvested pension
plans. This distinction typically is governed by federal law, dictating
when the pension plan vests, if at all. This distinction is, however,
informed by state law. To be vested means that the employee has a
right to the pension plan that cannot be decreased.80 If plans are
unvested, the employee does not yet have a right to the benefits.81
The pension plan may be modified by the employer in bankruptcy
until the plan vests under federal law.82 Outside of bankruptcy, the
question of when the pension plan vests and whether and to what
extent it can be modified is determined by state law.
72. See What You Should Know About Your Retirement Plan: Chapter 2, U.S.
DEP’T LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/wyskapr.html#chapter2 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2013).
73. See id.
74. See COURTNEY COLLINS & ANDREW J. RETTENMAIER, NAT’L CTR. FOR
POLICY ANALYSIS, UNFUNDED LIABILITIES OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT BENEFIT PLANS 13 (2010), available at http://www.ncpa.org/
pdfs/st329.pdf.
75. See generally id.
76. Id. at 11.
77. See generally id.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012).
79. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). ERISA sets minimum standards
for funding and unfunded plans would not meet ERISA standards. See generally id.
80. See In re UAL Corp. (Pilots’ Pension Plan Termination), 468 F.3d 444, 447
(7th Cir. 2006); In re Alan Wood Steel Co., No. 77-930 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20428,
at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1978).
81. See 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 119 (2005).
82. See In re Bastian Co., 45 B.R. 717, 720 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Private sector defined benefit pension plans can be modified or
terminated in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, but not solely as a matter of
federal bankruptcy law.83 ERISA, the statute governing private
sector defined-benefit pension plans, specifically provides for
termination of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)insured plans both in and out of bankruptcy.84 The prerequisites for
termination of PBGC-insured plans are listed in 29 U.S.C. §
1341(c)(2)(B).85 In In re Wire Rope Corp. of America, the court
determined that the debtor “cannot pay all of its debts under a plan
of reorganization and continue in business, and that court approval of
the termination of the Debtor’s Retirement Plan is appropriate.”86
The bankruptcy court has the discretion in determining whether such
entity will be unable to pay all debts pursuant to the plan of
reorganization unless the plan is terminated.87 PBGC-insured private
sector defined-benefit pension plans have been terminated or
modified in bankruptcy pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1341: In re Kaiser
Aluminum Corporation, where, the court held that an employer in a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy may terminate multiple pension plans
voluntarily under the reorganization test88 and In re US Airways
Group, where the court held that the financial requirements for a
distress termination were met and approved the termination.89

83. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); In re Falcon Prods., 497 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir.
2007).
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341; In re Bastian, 45 B.R. at 720.
85. The statute provides:
The requirements of this clause are met by a person if—
(I) such person has filed, or has had filed against such person, as of the
proposed termination date, a petition seeking reorganization in a case under
Title 11 or under any similar law of a State or political subdivision of a State
(or a case described in clause (i) filed by or against such person has been
converted, as of such date, to such a case in which reorganization is sought),
(II) such case has not, as of the proposed termination date, been dismissed,
(III) such person timely submits to the corporation any request for the
approval of the bankruptcy court (or other appropriate court in a case
under such similar law of a State or political subdivision) of the plan
termination, and (IV) the bankruptcy court (or such other appropriate
court) determines that, unless the plan is terminated, such person will be
unable to pay all its debts pursuant to a plan of reorganization and will be
unable to continue in business outside the chapter 11 reorganization process
and approves the termination.
29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i).
86. 287 B.R. 771, 781 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV).
88. See 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006).
89. 296 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).
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Added Complications of Chapter 9

Private sector pension plans can be modified or terminated by
debtors in Chapter 11 bankruptcies.90
However, Chapter 9
bankruptcies are more complicated vis-à-vis pension plans. Private
sector defined benefit plans are typically insured by the PBGC
through ERISA, while public sector defined benefit pension plans are
not.91
ERISA only governs private sector pension plans.92
Consequently, there is no federal insurer of public sector pension
plans as in the private sector.
While §§ 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code govern such plans
in the context of a bankruptcy case pending under Chapter 11 of the
Code, where private sector defined-benefit plans are at issue, they do
not apply in a Chapter 9 bankruptcy involving a municipal debtor.93
Section 1113 provides for extensive requirements that must be met
when rejecting a collective bargaining agreement under § 365.94
Section 1114 provides more stringent requirements when the debtor
is considering modification of insurance benefits to retirees.95
Congress enacted both of these provisions in reaction to the ruling in
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, where the Supreme Court allowed
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement without engaging in
further collective bargaining.96 Despite the absence of §§ 1113 and
1114 from § 901, Bildisco may govern in Chapter 9. Bildisco is a
decision regarding § 365, which does apply in a Chapter 9 case.97 The

90. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341; In re Bastian Co., 45 B.R. 717, 720 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1985).
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006) (noting that one of the purposes of the PBGC is
to encourage private pension plans).
92. See id.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (omitting §§ 1113 and 1114 from the list of sections of
the Bankruptcy Code that apply in Chapter 9).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (2012). The statute provides:
The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement only if the court finds that—(1) the trustee has, prior
to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements of subsection
(b)(1); (2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to
accept such proposal without good cause; and (3) the balance of the equities
clearly favors rejection of such agreement.

Id.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
96. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (listing § 365 as a provision that applies in Chapter 9).
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court in In re City of Vallejo stated that Bildisco applies when
interpreting § 365, but not all courts would necessarily agree.98
The principles of federalism also complicate public sector pension
plans in Chapter 9 bankruptcies.99 Chapter 9 governs municipality
bankruptcies though federal law while municipality governance is a
product of state law. Although ERISA governs private sector
pension plans, there is no federal law equivalent governing public
sector pension plans, because public sector pension plans are a
product of state and local law. These factors make modification of
public sector pension plans in a Chapter 9 bankruptcy and the legal
rationale behind contested modifications a new area of law.
D. California as the Focus
This Note focuses on public sector pension plans in California for a
number of reasons. California has a broad statute enabling its
municipalities to file for Chapter 9 protection.100 This means that
California gives broad access for its municipalities to take advantage
of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code allowing municipalities to
reorganize. It does not condition its grant of Chapter 9 authority on
being a certain class or type of municipality or having a specific type
of debt.101 California also has the highest number of Chapter 9 filings
This is noteworthy because
of cities or counties to date.102
municipality bankruptcies are rare. Orange County and the City of
Vallejo have recently exited bankruptcy. Stockton, Mammoth Lakes,
and San Bernadino all filed for Chapter 9 protection within two
weeks of one another in July 2012.103 Past and present case law is
helpful in analyzing municipality bankruptcies.
California state law exacerbates problems facing California
municipalities, which could result in more municipality bankruptcies

98. See In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 78–79 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009). There is
no case law where a court has rejected using Bildisco as governing law in Chapter 9
where a collective bargaining agreement is at issue.
99. This issue is further addressed in Part II.A.
100. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760 (West 2012).
101. Compare with Pennsylvania and Alabama’s grants of authority.
102. Surprise! California Not No. 1 in Chapter 9 Filings, INVESTMENT NEWS (July
16,
2012),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120716/FREE/120719948.
Nebraska has the highest number of Chapter 9 filings, but only of special tax districts,
not of cities or counties. Id.
103. Jim Christie, Update 3-San Bernardino 3rd California City to Seek
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (July 11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/
11/sanbernardino-bankruptcy-idUSL2E8IB2E520120711.

LAU_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1990

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

11/12/2013 11:17 PM

[Vol. XL

in the future unless the California legislature, or its population
through referendum, changes the law to prevent municipalities from
taking advantage of Chapter 9 or changing its state labor laws
regarding pension plans to be more beneficial to employers in
financial distress. CalPERS is favored under state labor law.104
Pension obligations in California are treated as contractual
obligations. This treatment of pension obligations allows for an
analysis of whether these contractual obligations are executory
contracts subject to rejection in bankruptcy and gives rise to a
discussion of what happens after executory contracts are rejected.
The California Constitution prohibits municipalities from imposing
property taxes exceeding one percent of the property value.105 This
restriction prevents municipalities from raising revenue through
raises in property taxes.106
II. FEDERAL LAW V. STATE LAW AND THE NATURE OF PENSION
PLANS
A. Federalism Issues in Chapter 9: Where State and Federal
Powers Conflict
Bankruptcy is an area where federal law and state law intersect and
as a result, conflict. The federal government derives its power to
enact bankruptcy laws from the Constitution.107 The Constitution
explicitly states, “The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish . . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.”108 Therefore, the federal grant of power is exclusive and
comes directly from the language of the Constitution.109 If Congress
enacts laws of bankruptcy, any contradictory state law is deemed
preempted in the bankruptcy context.110

104. For more information on California state labor law, see infra Part II.E.1.
105. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §1(a). (“The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax
on real property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such
property. The one percent (1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned
according to law to the districts within the counties.”).
106. See id.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id; see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009).
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The federal government also has the exclusive power to abrogate
contracts.111 Bankruptcy is an important tool for financially distressed
entities because it allows debtors, either as debtors-in-possession or
through a trustee to abrogate contracts that are deemed to not have
any net benefit on the estate.112 States cannot abrogate contracts, so
debtors must take advantage of the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code in order to do so.113
The power of state governments also originates from the
Constitution. The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”114 In the context of bankruptcy, the power to enact laws of
bankruptcy has been specifically delegated to the federal
government.115 Although Congress has exclusive power to enact
bankruptcy laws, Congress has left some room for states to legislate in
the context of municipality bankruptcies. Section 903 states,
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control,
by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the
exercise of the political or governmental powers of such
municipality, including expenditures for such exercise, but—(1) a
State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of
such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to
such composition; and (2) a judgment entered under such a law may
not bind a creditor that does not consent to such composition.116

This provision leaves room to legislate and respects the sovereignty
of states to regulate their municipalities.117 State laws do have some
effect in bankruptcy. Section 903 appears to limit the ability of
municipalities in Chapter 9 to take full advantage of provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code by reserving deference to state law.

111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”).
112. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (allowing debtors to reject executory
contracts); 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012) (allowing debtors to assign contracts even if the
contract prohibits assignment).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (stating that no state may abrogate contracts).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
116. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
117. See id.
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States are also given the authority to dictate whether their
municipalities may take advantage of Chapter 9 through the second
requirement of § 109—the requirement that states explicitly authorize
municipality bankruptcy by statute.118 The court in In re City of
Vallejo makes clear that states may only prevent municipalities from
entering bankruptcy as a threshold issue.119 Once municipalities are in
Chapter 9, all provisions listed in § 901 and Chapter 9 apply.120
Because each provision of the Bankruptcy Code governs a small
aspect of the reorganization, the Bankruptcy Code must be read as a
whole.
Although states are constitutionally prohibited from
abrogating contracts, the federal government may do so and the
Bankruptcy Clause allows the federal government to abrogate
contracts.121
Therefore, federal law must trump state law in
bankruptcy for municipalities to modify pension obligations, if
pension obligations are deemed to be contractual rights.
B.

Various State Law Perspectives on the Nature of Pension
Plans and Their Ability to be Modified in Bankruptcy

Public pension plans are generally created under state or local
law.122 Outside of bankruptcy, modification of pension plans depends
on state law.123 In bankruptcy, modification of pension plans largely
depends on whether the pension plan is an executory contract that
can be rejected. There are three main state law perspectives on the
nature of pension plans. Pension plans can be viewed as a gratuity, a
property right, or a contractual right.124 This view has evolved over
the years and a majority of jurisdictions, including California, now
view pension plans as contractual rights.
Pension plans may be modified or terminated in those jurisdictions
that view pension plans as gratuities, as long as payouts to pension
plan beneficiaries have not already been made.125 These jurisdictions
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See supra text accompanying note 44.
In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009).
Id.
See U.S. CONST. art I. §10, cl. 1, 4.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2006).
Pension Plan Modifications Provide Sustainability, NAT’L INST.

ON

RETIREMENT SECURITY, (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.nirsonline.org/index.php?option=
content&task=view&id=733 (stating that forty-five states have enacted defined
benefit pension reforms since 2008).
124. Discussed infra.
125. See Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 1944) (regarding the
pension plan of a railroad company outside of bankruptcy).
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view pension plans as gifts from the employer, public or private, that
the employees do not have any legal right to, until the benefits are
actually paid out.126 Since employees generally do not make
contributions to the pension plan, the employer may grant or
withhold benefits, terminate or withdraw the making of contributions,
or completely terminate the pension plan at will.127 This view of
pension plans as gratuities has changed in most jurisdictions.
Jurisdictions that viewed pension plans as gratuities in the past have
altered their views regarding pension plans and now view them as
either property rights or contractual rights. This change is due to the
fact that there is now an expectation of pension benefits upon
retirement.128 Most public and private sector employees enter into
employment with the expectation that there will be some contribution
to retirement benefits by the employer that they will receive upon
retirement. The view that pension plans are gratuities that can be
modified or terminated at the will of the employer has been
considered too draconian, and has largely disappeared.
A significant minority of jurisdictions view pension plans as
property rights subject to constitutional due process protection. In
these jurisdictions, broad modifications of pension benefits may be
possible, provided that due process is afforded, especially where the
modifications are necessary to preserve the financial viability of the
pension plan and to protect the participants’ property rights.129 In re
Marriage of Roehn held that a non-employee spouse’s future benefits
from pension fund are a form of deferred compensation and therefore

126. See id.
127. Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l Union, 193 F. Supp. 699,
700 (D.D.C 1961), aff’d sub nom., Neuffer v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int’l
Union of Am., 307 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
128. But see id. (stating that there is no expectation to pension benefits).
129. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Ellman & Merrett, supra note 20, at
382–83 (2011) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”)); see also Spina v. Consol. Police &
Firemen’s Pension Fund Comm’n, 197 A.2d 169, 175 (N.J. 1964) (“[W]e think the
employee has a property interest in an existing fund which the State could not simply
confiscate.”); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 304 (N.M. 1995) (“Property rights are also
protected under the [D]ue [P]rocess and [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lauses.”); State ex
rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 648–53 (Ohio 1998)
(evaluating legislation modifying the treatment of mandatory contributions to
retirement system under Takings Clause and Equal Protection Clause).
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property.130 In re Gendreau held that pension plans are property
rights that cannot be discharged.131 In jurisdictions that view pension
plans as property rights, pension plans cannot be modified without
due process of law whether they are vested (In re Marriage of
Roehn)132 or unvested (In re Gendreau).133 Since these jurisdictions
do not view public pensions as contracts, outright rejection under §
365 is not an available tool. Any modification of public pension plans
must be made with due process.
In a majority of jurisdictions, including California, employees are
recognized to possess an express or implied contractual right to their
pension benefits once they begin employment with a municipality.
This view has been established through common law, state
constitutions, and state statutes. In Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, the
Washington Supreme Court held that a public “employee who
accepts a job to which a pension plan is applicable contracts for a
substantial pension and is entitled to receive the same when he has
fulfilled the prescribed conditions.”134 In Calabro v. City of Omaha,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that “a public employee’s
constitutionally protected right in his or her pension vests upon the
acceptance and commencement of employment, subject to reasonable
or equitable unilateral changes by the Legislature.”135 Betts v. Board
of Administration of Public Employees’ Retirement System held that
“a public employee’s pension constitutes an element of
compensation, and a vested contractual right to pension benefits
accrues upon acceptance of employment. Such a pension right may
not be destroyed, once vested, without impairing a contractual
obligation of the employing public entity.”136
The Illinois
Constitution establishes that pension benefits are contractual rights.137
California has enacted state statutes stating pension benefits are

130. In re Marriage of Roehn, 576 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
131. In re Gendreau, 191 B.R. 798, 805 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 122 F.3d 815
(9th Cir. 1997).
132. 576 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ill. 1991).
133. 191 B.R. 798, 805 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) aff’d, 122 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1997).
134. Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 296 P.2d 536, 540 (Wash. 1956).
135. Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Neb. 1995).
136. Betts v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 21 Cal. 3d 859, 863 (Cal.
1978).
137. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
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contractual rights that cannot be abrogated.138 In jurisdictions where
pension plans are contractual rights, such as California, they may be
treated as executory contracts that may be rejected in bankruptcy.
Jurisdictions that consider pension plans to be contractual rights
generally distinguish between vested and unvested rights, discussed
infra. The state law concept does not bind federal bankruptcy courts
construing the Bankruptcy Code because of the Supremacy Clause;139
nevertheless, § 365 has been construed to prevent rejection of vested
rights (as the term is understood under federal bankruptcy law).
C.

Whether a Pension Plan is an Executory Contract: The
Countryman Test

In those jurisdictions where pension plans are viewed as
contractual rights, the pension plans may be rejected if they are
determined to be executory contracts. Section 365, which permits the
rejection of executory contracts,140 applies in Chapter 9 cases.141
However, the term “executory contract” is not defined in the
Bankruptcy Code. While federal bankruptcy law defines the scope
and effect of such a rejection, and while the definition of an executory
contract is ultimately a federal question, these issues are informed by
state law.142 Countryman’s test, which determines which contracts are
executory and which are not, tries to determine precisely what this
federal standard is and how it relates to state law concepts of what is
executory.
Professor Countryman defines an executory contract as a contract
“under which the only obligation of both the bankrupt and the other
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either
to complete the performance would constitute a material breach

138. CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., VESTED RIGHTS OF CALPERS MEMBERS,
PROTECTING THE PENSION PROMISES MADE TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, (2011), available
at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/vested-rights.pdf.
139. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012).
142. Horton v. Rehbein (In re Rehbein), 60 B.R. 436, 440 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986)
(“Whether a contract is executory is a question of federal law.”) (citing In re Cochise
College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1348 n.4 (9th Cir.1983); In re Alexander, 670 F.2d
885, 888 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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excusing the performance of the other.”143 The Ninth Circuit adopted
The Supreme Court in Bildisco has
Countryman’s test.144
substantially adopted the same definition.145 Under this definition,
vested rights typically do not qualify as an executory contract,
whereas unvested rights would qualify as an executory contract.
Whether and when a pension plan vests and whether the pension
plan is vested or unvested at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed is
a matter of federal law that is informed by state law. Whether the
contract is executory can turn on whether the pension plan has
vested. The state law concept does not bind federal bankruptcy
courts construing the Bankruptcy Code because of the Supremacy
Clause; nevertheless, § 365 has been construed to prevent rejection of
vested rights (as the term is understood under federal bankruptcy
law).
The bankruptcy court in In re Bastian Co., which involved a private
employer in Chapter 11 with an ERISA-governed plan, held that
pension plans are executory contracts subject to § 365 because
performance remains on both sides.146 Employees need to work for
continued pension contributions and the employer needs to continue
contributing to the pension plan in order to compel employee
performance.147 In re Philip Service Corporation, on the other hand,
held that distress termination of an unvested private sector pension
plan was not allowed under ERISA and the debtor may not reject an
ERISA-governed pension plan as an executory contract.148 A
bankruptcy court in Texas determined that a specific statute (ERISA)
trumps a general, broad statute (Bankruptcy Code).149 The courts are
therefore divided as to whether unvested pension plans can be
rejected as executory contracts.
The Seventh Circuit in In re UAL Corp. (Pilots’ Pension Plan
Termination) held that the “‘[t]ermination’ of a plan does not end
anyone’s right to receive vested benefits; it just prevents an increase

143. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973).
144. See In re Alexander, 670 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1982).
145. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 & n.6 (1984).
146. In re Bastian Co., 45 B.R. 717, 721 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Similarly, there
is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code excluding pension plans from § 365.
Therefore, pension plans are rejectable as executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. §
365.”).
147. Id. at 720–21.
148. 310 B.R. 802, 809 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004).
149. Id.
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in those benefits, which will be paid from the trust and, to the extent
that fund is insufficient, by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation.”150 The Pennsylvania bankruptcy court in In re Alan
Wood Steel Co. found that a pension plan with vested participants
was not a wholly executory contract and could not be rejected:151
The debtor, by the completion of the plan-participants’ age and
service requirements for vesting under the plans, has received all of
the consideration for which it bargained with its employees. The
contracts between them are executed except for the debtor’s
obligation to pay the specified benefits in the case of the Hourly
Plan, and make certain accrued periodic contributions under the
Salaried Plan. By a “rejection” the debtor would be relinquishing
no benefits; it would merely be repudiating its obligations.152

The bankruptcy courts are generally in agreement that once a
pension plan has vested, the contract is no longer wholly executory
and cannot be rejected as such.
Where pension obligations are tied to a collective bargaining
agreement, the municipality may have to reject the entire agreement
in order to reject the pension obligation, provided that the collective
bargaining agreement is viewed as a single contract. Occasionally, the
collective bargaining agreement is viewed as separate contracts. In
this situation, one portion, as long as determined to be executory may
be rejected pursuant to § 365. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
does not allow a debtor to “cherry pick” which portions of contracts
to assume or reject, but rather the debtor must assume reject the
contract in its entirety.153
Courts have held that private sector pension plans are executory
contracts rejectable in bankruptcy.154 A bankruptcy court in New
York in In re McFarlin’s Inc., held that the collective bargaining
agreement upon which a pension plan was based was an executory
contract that could be rejected in bankruptcy and thus the claim

150. 468 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 2006).
151. No. 77-930, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20428, at *51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 29,
1978).
152. Id. at *16.
153. Pieco, Inc. v. Atl. Computer Sys., 173 B.R. 844, 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(citing Hurly v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 213 U.S. 126 (1909); In re
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 321 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1963)).
154. See, e.g., In re Am. R. Co. of P.R., 110 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R.1952), aff’d, 202
F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1953); see also In re Alan Wood Steel Co., No. 77-930, 1978 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20428 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1978), aff’d, 449 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
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would be treated as a general unsecured claim.155 The claim would
not be treated as a first priority under § 507(a), which contemplates
administrative claims, including costs of running a business in
bankruptcy, having a priority over general unsecured claims.156
Subtitle E of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1381, from the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments of 1980 deals with unfunded vested
pension plan interests and withdrawal liability for the employer.157
Congress excluded collective bargaining agreements from the
Railway Labor Act but not the National Labor Relations Act,
thereby demonstrating that Congress knew how to exclude collective
bargaining agreements when it wanted to.158 Its failure to exclude
collective bargaining agreements from § 365 may indicate that it
meant to include collective bargaining agreements.159 In re WheelingPittsburgh Steel Corp. also held that pension plans are executory
contracts.160 In In re Robinson Truck Line, a Mississippi bankruptcy
court held that a Chapter 11 debtor could assume the private sector
pension plan as an executory contract upon the adequate assurance of
a prompt cure of prepetition arrearages rather than upon immediate
cash payment of the total arrearage on the effective date of the
Chapter 11 plan, and that the prepetition arrearage could be classified
with priority for unsecured claims for contributions to the employee
benefit plan.161 This treatment is exactly what is required under § 365
for rejection or assumption of an executory contract.162 This line of
case law addressing private sector pension plans as executory
contracts subject to rejection under § 365 in a bankruptcy case
indicates that this option may also be available in a municipality
bankruptcy dealing with public sector pension plans, provided that
the pension plan has not already vested.
California’s municipalities have a contractual relationship with
CalPERS, the administrator of its public employee pension plans.163

155. In re McFarlin’s Inc., 46 B.R. 88, 90 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985).
156. Id. at 90.
157. Id. at 89.
158. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1984).
159. Id.
160. 103 B.R. 672 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
161. 47 B.R. 631 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012).
163. CalPERS’ Brief in Support of the City of Stockton’s Petition at 5, In re City of
Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 711. The brief
states:
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This contract may also be analyzed to determine if it is executory.
California municipalities are obligated to make contributions to
CalPERS in return for CalPERS continuing to administer their public
sector pension plans.164 CalPERS claims that the relationship
between the municipality and CalPERS is contractual, established by
statute and common law.165 If the relationship is a contract, it appears
to be executory under Countryman’s test, because there are
obligations left for both municipalities and CalPERS.
D. Rejection as a Prepetition Breach of Contract
Rejection has been compared to a prepetition breach of contract.
As such, rejection results in a prepetition claim against the estate for
breach of that contract. A debtor’s ability to reject or assume
contracts often results in negotiation in the shadow of this law.
E.

Federalism Issues Regarding Treatment of the Pension Plan
as a Prepetition Breach of Contract Claim

Once a public pension plan has been rejected as an executory
contract and a claim has been filed against the estate as a prepetition
breach of contract claim, state law and federal law may conflict
regarding how the claim will be treated in bankruptcy. Whether state
law or federal law is binding determines how a pension plan may be
treated in bankruptcy. Here, California state labor law and federal
law are analyzed because California state law and federal bankruptcy
law are the most at odds.

For public employees serving municipalities in California, CalPERS
provides retirement benefits to employees through a three-way structure:
(1) the municipality has a “contract” with CalPERS that triggers statutes
and other laws governing the provision of pension benefits through
CalPERS; (2) the public servant has an employment contract with the
municipality that includes pension benefits; and (3) CalPERS has a fiduciary
responsibility to provide and protect the pension benefits of its employee
members. This three-way structure is the basis for the trust relationship
between the parties where the municipality is the trustor, the members are
the beneficiaries and CalPERS is the trustee.

Id.
164. See id. at 2 (“The relationship between CalPERS and the City is executory in
nature: CalPERS continues to provide benefits and the City continues to report, fund
and otherwise comply with State law in connection with its participation in the
system. The City’s obligations to CalPERS are not negotiable.”).
165. See id. at 5–6.
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Treatment Under California State Labor Law

Under California state law, there is generally a vested/unvested
distinction, where unvested pension plans may be modified or
terminated, whereas vested rights cannot be impaired.166 This is true
even if the pension plan has been rejected as an executory contract.
Whether the claim against the bankruptcy estate can be impaired
through a plan of reorganization also depends on this distinction.
A state’s distinction between vested and unvested rights may differ
from that of federal law. In California, pension plans vest on the first
day of employment167 because state statutes create contractual rights
on the first day of employment.168 These rights are private contractual
rights, as explained by the court in California Teachers Association:
“[the] statute offering pension rights in return for employee services
expresses an element of exchange and thereby implies these rights
will be private rights in the nature of contract.”169
Early California labor law allowed for flexibility in modifying
pension plans. Kern provided for “reasonable modifications” stating
that “pension systems must be kept flexible to permit adjustments in
accord with changing conditions and at the same time maintain the
integrity of the system and carry out its beneficent policy.”170 After
Kern, California courts adopted a new rule regarding pension plans,
ruling that changes are to be consistent with the theory of a pension
system and that all detrimental changes be offset by “comparable new
advantages.”171 Twelve other states have adopted California’s rule in
Allen requiring “comparable new advantages” when modifying a
pension plan.172 This new rule limits employers within the state’s

166. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, Statutes As Contracts? The “California Rule”
and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1050–51 (2012)
(describing California’s distinction between vested and unvested pension plans).
167. Betts v. Bd. of Admin. of the Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 582 P.2d 614, 617
(Cal. 1978) (en banc) (stating that the right to a “substantial” or “reasonable”
pension accrues on first day of employment).
168. Monahan, supra note 166, at 1046.
169. Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Cory, 202 Cal. Rptr. 611, 618 (Ct. App. 1984).
170. Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947) (en banc).
171. Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (citing Wallace v. City of
Fresno, 265 P.2d 884, 887–88 (Cal. 1954); Packer v. Bd. of Ret. of L.A. Cnty. Peace
Officers’ Ret. Sys., 217 P.2d 660, 661–62, 664–65 (Cal. 1950) (en banc)).
172. Monahan, supra note 166, at 1071. These states are Alaska, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, and Washington. Id. Compare this list with the list of states that allow
broad access to Chapter 9. Those states that allow broad access to Chapter 9 and
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ability to make changes to pension benefits of all current employees.
For example, a statutory change adding a new dollar-amount
maximum for pension benefits was impermissible because the change
came with no comparable advantage to participants.173 As a result,
pension benefits cannot be detrimentally changed, even if the change
is only prospective.
These new advantages must also be
contemporaneous with detrimental changes.174 California courts later
expanded their rule even further to limit modifications to future
accruals. In Legislature v. Eu, the California Supreme Court went
even further than the court in United Firefighters, explicitly
recognizing the “collateral right to earn future pension benefits
through continued service, on terms substantially equivalent to those
then offered.”175 This means that even the rate of future accruals
cannot be altered.176 California courts have never explained why
future accruals must be protected, especially since public employees
can be fired and their compensation lowered.177
In states like California, where state labor laws and public policy
concerns favor employees, states may argue that their laws apply in
treatment of claims in bankruptcy. The states may cite to other areas
of bankruptcy where the Bankruptcy Code allows deference to state
law. These provisions include § 522, under which debtors may opt to
take state law exemptions instead of the federal exemptions of
personal assets from the bankruptcy estate.178 Bankruptcy courts

have adopted California’s rule in Allen will face similar problems to California when
trying to negotiate changes to pension plans in bankruptcy.
173. Chapin v. City Comn’n, 307 P.2d 657, 660 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
174. See Betts v. Bd. of Admin. of the Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 582 P.2d 614, 619
(Cal. 1978) (improvement enacted in 1963 could not be used to justify detrimental
change in 1974); Abbott v. City of San Diego, 332 P.2d 324, 329 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1958).
175. Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1331 (Cal. 1991).
176. Id.; Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1955).
177. Monahan, supra note 166, at 1077.
178. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012). Section 522 provides in pertinent part:
(3) Property listed in this paragraph is—(A) subject to subsections (o) and
(p), any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection
(d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the
filing of the petition to the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been
located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the
petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single State for
such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located
for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer
portion of such 180-day period than in any other place.
Id. (b)(3)(A).
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have also given great deference to states in how to treat severance
pay to employees, whether as an administrative expense in
bankruptcy, which is given the second priority under § 507, or as a
prepetition claim.179
States that want their state labor laws to apply may argue that §
943(b)(4) prevents the bankruptcy court from confirming a plan of
reorganization that impairs pension plans in violation of state law.180
If impairing vested pension plans is a violation of state law, as it is in
California under its definition of what it means to be a vested plan,
then the bankruptcy court cannot confirm a plan that impairs pension
plans. However, what § 943(b)(4) means as applied to Chapter 9
bankruptcies can be compared with § 1129 requirements for plan
confirmation in Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Section 1129 also contains
a provision where a plan cannot be confirmed if the plan includes
modifications that violate state law or nonbankruptcy federal law
outside of bankruptcy.181
CalPERS, in its brief in the Stockton bankruptcy case in support of
Stockton’s eligibility, argues that state law protects public employee
pension funds and prevents California and its municipalities from
“raiding pension funds to balance the State budget.”182 CalPERS
argues that under California state law, including the California
Constitution, municipalities are unable to modify public pension
plans subject to CalPERS administration.183 This relationship is
179. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2012).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4) (2012) (“The court shall confirm the plan if . . . (4) the
debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the
plan.”).
181. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(16) (2012) (“All transfers of property under the plan shall
be made in accordance with any applicable provisions of nonbankruptcy law that
govern the transfer of property by a corporation or trust that is not a moneyed,
business, or commercial corporation or trust.”).
182. Brief for Petitioner at 6, In re City of Stockton, Cal., No. 12-32118 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 711. The brief states:
Proposition 162 amended the California Constitution to provide that the
CalPERS Board has “the sole and exclusive power to provide for actuarial
services in order to assure the competency of the assets” of the system. CAL.
CONST., art. XVI, sec. 17, subd. (e). The intent behind the measure was to
protect public pension funds by vesting the authority to direct actuarial
determinations solely with the governing board. See Lubic Dec., Exhibit 4
at 36 (Relevant Portions of Official Ballot Pamphlet (Nov. 3, 1992)). By
granting the CalPERS Board sole authority to administer the system,
Proposition 162 prevented the legislative and executive branches from
“raiding” pension funds to balance the State budget.
Id. at 38.
183. See id. at 9.
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defined by state law.184 CalPERS further argues that Stockton may
terminate its relationship with CalPERS, but it would then be
required to make a termination payment to CalPERS in an amount
that would be sufficient to ensure that all accrued pension benefits
can be paid.185 If Stockton terminates its relationship with CalPERS,
its termination payment would be about $950 million, as determined
by CalPERS.186 CalPERS therefore argues that under relevant state
law, termination is not a viable option for Stockton.187

2.

Treatment Under Federal Bankruptcy Law

Under federal law, the vested/unvested distinction merely confirms
the existence of a contractual obligation. While state law and state
actors are constitutionally unable to abrogate contracts, federal law is
not constrained by the Contract Clause in the US Constitution.188 The
Bankruptcy Code is consistent with this view in allowing rejection of
executory contracts and modification of contracts through a plan of
reorganization.
Once rejected, a claim for a prepetition breach of an executory
contract (here, pension obligations) can be treated through a plan of
reorganization.189 They must be part of executory contract (i.e.
someone who has already retired is no longer party to an executory
contract since the retiree presumably has fulfilled all material
obligations of the contract and all that is left is for the municipality to
fulfill its obligation to make pension plan contributions). There is
prior case law involving bankruptcies in both the private sector and
the public sector regarding such modifications.
There is precedent involving treatment of rejected Chapter 11
pension plans in bankruptcy. In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy involving
an unvested private sector employer, the court treated the rejected
executory contract, which included a pension plan, as a claim against
184. Id. at 9.
185. Id. at 13.
186. Id. at 14–15.
187. Id. at 15–18.
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Contract Clause provides:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

Id.
189. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
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the estate and a general unsecured claim in bankruptcy.190 The claim
was not treated as a priority under § 507(a), which contemplates
administrative claims, including costs of running a business in
bankruptcy, having a priority over general unsecured claims.191
There are also two examples of municipalities in Chapter 9 that
have modified or terminated pension plans in bankruptcy. First,
Prichard, Alabama, filed for Chapter 9 protection in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Alabama on
October 27, 2009.192 Pension obligations owed to former municipal
employees was among the causes of Prichard’s filing.193 Pension debt
was also among the causes of Prichard’s 1999 filing for Chapter 9
protection.194 The plan of reorganization in Prichard’s first filing
mandated a $16.5 million increase in the pension fund.195 However,
this plan provision was never implemented, resulting in an increased
retirement fund burden for the city.196 The pension fund finally ran
out of money nine years after the 2010 plan was confirmed in
September 2009.197 In response, the city simply stopped paying out
pensions to its retirees.198 The retirees sued to enforce the 2010 plan
190. In re McFarlin’s Inc. 46 B.R. 88, 90 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985).
191. Id.
192. Chapter 9 Voluntary Petition at 1, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000
(Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 1.
193. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000 (Bankr.
S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 36. The brief states:
On August 13, 2009, the Prichard Retirees filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court of Mobile County against the Debtor, the City of Prichard (“the
Debtor” or “the City”), as well as Mayor Ron Davis and all five City
Council Members for the City of Prichard. In Count One of their complaint,
the Prichard Retirees allege that the defendants negligently failed to take
steps to ensure the financial viability of the Prichard Pension Fund. In
Count Two, the Prichard Retirees request that circuit court declare that the
City violated this Court’s previous order dated October 6, 2000, which
required the City to provide for the appropriate incremental $16.5 million
payment to the Pension Fund, and enter judgment against the City for that
amount. Finally, in Count Three, the Prichard Retirees allege that City
Council Members Napolean Bracy, Herman Towner and Troy Ephriam,
individually and in their capacities as members of the Board of Pension,
breached their fiduciary duties to the Prichard Retirees, causing the
Retirees to suffer damages. The Retirees demanded trial of their claims by
jury.
Id. at 1.
194. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 20, at 387.
195. See id.
196. Hueske, supra note 14.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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provisions, causing Prichard to seek Chapter 9 protection again.199
Prichard proposed to restructure and cap the outstanding pension
obligations owed to municipal retirees in its May 2010 plan.200 Their
plan faced many objections from creditors resulting in amended
versions of their plan for adjustment.201
On August 11, 2010, Prichard’s creditors filed a motion to dismiss
the Chapter 9 case, arguing that the city had never been authorized
to seek Chapter 9 relief under the laws of Alabama, because it had
no ‘refunding or funding’ bond debt as allegedly required under
section 11-81-3 of the Alabama Code, and therefore did not satisfy
the requirements for being a ‘debtor’ under Bankruptcy Code §
109(c).202

The bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss and Prichard
appealed.203 The bankruptcy court stayed the case while the Alabama
Supreme Court decided whether section 11-81-3 of the Alabama
Code grants all municipalities authority to seek relief under Chapter
9, or if such relief is limited to municipalities holding “refunding or
funding debt.”204
In Central Falls, Rhode Island, pension plan reductions were
negotiated according to the City’s fourth amended plan of
reorganization, confirmed on September 11, 2012.205 Classes 9 and 10
were to be impaired classes of retirees.206 Class 9 retirees’ pensions
199. Id.
200. Chapter 9 Plan of Adjustment at 8–9, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 0915000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 134.
201. Prichard filed five amended plans. Fifth Amended Plan of Adjustment, In re
City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 296.
202. Hueske, supra note 14; see also Motion to Dismiss Bankruptcy Case, In re
City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 186.
203. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Case, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 0915000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009), ECF No. 202; Notice of Appeal to District
Court, In re City of Prichard, Ala., No. 09-15000 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2009),
ECF No. 217.
204. Hueske, supra note 14.
205. Order Confirming Chapter 9 Plan at 2, In re City of Central Falls, R.I., No. 1113105 (D.R.I. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 572; Chapter 9 Plan Fourth Amended Plan for
the Adjustment of Debts Filed by Debtor The City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, In
re City of Central Falls, R.I., No. 11-13105 (Bankr. D.R.I. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No.
479.
206. Chapter 9 Plan Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts Filed by
Debtor The City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, In re City of Central Falls, R.I., No.
11-13105 (Bankr. D.R.I. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 479. Members of Class 9 and 10 are
listed in Exhibits G and H of the plan, respectively. Id. There are five members in
Class 9, whose retirement benefits prior to the Chapter 9 filing are unclear, although
it can be assumed that their benefits prior to the Chapter 9 filing were greater than
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will be reduced to $10,000 and class 10 retirees’ pension would be
reduced by fifty-five percent.207 The impaired classes under the
Central Falls’ plan also included members who were already retired,
where the benefits presumably already vested.208 Because both the
Central Falls and Prichard cases involved reducing pension plans that
were already vested (they were already retired and receiving checks),
these cases indicate that both vested and unvested pension plans may
be modified or terminated in bankruptcy.
A cram down, where the bankruptcy court may impose a plan of
reorganization over the objection of some impaired classes, is
available under federal bankruptcy law and possibly applies to
Chapter 9 bankruptcies.209 Section 1129 has been incorporated into
Chapter 9 through § 901.210 Section 1129 deals with a cram down on
creditors—impaired classes that do not agree with the plan of
reorganization proposed.211 Under Chapter 11, meeting § 1129
requirements if an impaired class does not vote in favor the plan of
reorganization requires the bankruptcy court to find that the plan is
fair and equitable to all creditors before confirming the plan.212 The
fair and equitable requirement can be met in Chapter 11 as long as
the absolute priority rule is met.213 However, the absolute priority
rule cannot be met in Chapter 9 because municipalities cannot
liquidate, and an analysis of what would occur if the municipality
were to liquidate cannot be conducted.214 Therefore, the test in a
Chapter 9 case for the fair and equitable requirement is whether what
the impaired class is to receive under the plan of reorganization is all
they can reasonably expect under the circumstances215 This requires
the bankruptcy court to determine if the amount to be payable to an
impaired class is fair given their level of priority in the bankruptcy
case and whether it is fair given the situation.216 The court may

$10,000 because they are listed as an impaired class. Id. at Exhibit G. There are
thirty-five members in Class 10. Id. at Exhibit H.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012).
210. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012).
211. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)(1).
212. Id.
213. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
214. Newhouse v. Concoran Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690, 691 (9th Cir. 1940).
215. Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942) (citing West
Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 654, 679 (9th Cir. 1940)).
216. Id.
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consider factors inherent in the running of a municipality.217
Generally, however, courts give great deference to the municipality in
determining what is fair.218
III. PENSION PLANS MAY BE REJECTED AS E XECUTORY
CONTRACTS
This discussion of rejecting pension plans as executory contracts
must be limited to jurisdictions that view pension plans as executory
contracts, because only those pension plans fall within § 365. In
jurisdictions such as California, where public employees’ rights under
pension plans are viewed as contractual rights, pension plans may be
rejected as executory contracts pursuant to § 365 as applied at a
Chapter 9 municipal reorganization proceeding.219 The extent to
which rejection amounts to a modification of pension plan obligations
will depend upon the extent to which these obligations have “vested”
under federal law.220 States may have varying definitions of what it
means to be “vested” and California does have a very different
definition of a vested pension plan within the state.221 Although
federal law can be informed by state law definitions, due to
federalism concerns and an interest in uniformity in administering
bankruptcy estates, federal law ultimately trumps state law in the
bankruptcy context.222 This makes sense, given the Supremacy
Clause, Bankruptcy Clause, and Contracts Clause of the Constitution.
Municipalities may, therefore, use the tools available in bankruptcy to
reorganize debt and better provide for their constituencies going
forward.
In those jurisdictions that view pension plans as contractual rights,
pension plans may be rejected under § 365 if they are found to be
executory contracts.223 Pension plans of current employees are
executory because there are obligations left to be performed on both
sides to the contract.224 The employee must continue to work for the
employer and the employer must continue to pay the employee and

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

In re Corcoran Hospital Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 459 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999).
11 U.S.C. § 928(b) (2012); Newhouse, 114 F.2d at 690.
See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
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contribute to the pension plan.225 Since there are obligations left on
both sides, a pension plan as part of an employment contract is an
executory contract under the Countryman test that can be rejected
under § 365.226 Section 365 does not, however, permit rejection of
employment contracts of employees who have already retired.227
Rejection under § 365 only applies to executory contracts—it does
not permit “rejection” in the absence of mutual performance
obligations; it also does not permit “rejection” of vested rights, which
must otherwise be respected in bankruptcy and in a plan of
reorganization.228 These are not executory contracts because the only
meaningful obligation left is for the employer to contribute to the
pension plans.229 These rights have already been vested under federal
law and cannot be abrogated.230 The municipality may, however,
negotiate a modification with the retirees, as was the case in Prichard,
Alabama and Central Falls, Rhode Island.231
Once rejected, these pension plans can be treated under a plan of
reorganization allowing for modification of pension plan
obligations.232 A cram down is allowed under the Bankruptcy Code
because § 1129 has been incorporated into Chapter 9.233 If public
pensioners as an impaired class do not vote in favor of the plan of
reorganization, the court can still confirm the plan if it is fair and
equitable as to all creditors.234 The debtor may negotiate with
employees with both vested and unvested rights.235 Nevertheless, a
cram down is only applicable if the rights have not vested under
federal law.236 In states like California, where the state views pension
plans as “vested” on the first day of employment, the right may not be
“vested” under federal law.237 Federal law definitions are binding.238
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As such, the pension plans of those who have not yet retired or
qualify to retire may be modified in bankruptcy.239
In California, where pension plans have been determined to be
contractual rights, pension plans that are unvested under federal law
are executory contracts despite any state law to the contrary.240
Furthermore, the relationship between CalPERS and state agencies
and municipalities is executory, as conceded by CalPERS.241 This
relationship can, therefore, also be rejected as an executory contract
subject to a prepetition breach of contract claim.242 As such, the
“termination payment” determined by CalPERS, may be negotiated
as part of a bankruptcy case.243
Since public sector pension plans in jurisdictions that view pension
plans as contractual rights may be modified in bankruptcy, Congress
and state legislatures must balance allowing municipalities to
reorganize and meet obligations in their confirmed plans with
protecting future retirees. Congress can help municipalities by
enacting a section of the Bankruptcy Code specifically allowing for
the rejection of public pension plans as executory contracts to
dissolve some of the uncertainty and hesitation with modification of
public sector pension plans. State legislatures may also enact laws
that are more favorable to municipalities in bankruptcy. In the
alternative, if public policy dictates protecting public pensioners,
Congress may enact a statute similar to ERISA in insuring public
sector pension plans. State legislatures may also further limit access
to Chapter 9 to municipalities that do not have pension debt. State
legislatures may also enact a statute insuring public sector pension
plans within the state.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 9 is a seldom-used tool for eligible municipalities to
organize their debts. Although Chapter 9 filings are rare, they are
becoming more widely used by municipalities that have, in good faith,
exhausted all other mechanisms of renegotiating and reorganizing
their debts. In many municipalities facing bankruptcy, public
employee pensions are a growing concern, with underfunded pension
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plans.244 Because there is little case law on the treatment of pensions
in Chapter 9, treatment of pensions in Chapter 11 may be analogous
to how pension plans may be treated under Chapter 9.245 As such,
treatment of pensions in Chapter 11 must be examined.246 However,
Chapter 9 adds complications because of issues of federalism and
limits on the power of the bankruptcy court. 247
In jurisdictions such as California, where public employees’ rights
under pension plans are viewed as contractual rights, pension plans
may be rejected as executory contracts, pursuant to § 365, as applied
at a Chapter 9 municipal reorganization proceeding.248 The extent to
which rejection amounts to a modification of pension plan obligations
will depend upon the extent to which these obligations have “vested”
under federal law.249 Although there are competing definitions of
what it means to be “vested,” the federal law definition ultimately
binds municipalities availing themselves of the protection of Chapter
9, a federal bankruptcy law concept.250 Once pension plans are
rejected as executory contracts, claims for breach of that executory
contract are treated as prepetition claims under § 365.251 As such,
these claims may be dealt with in a plan of reorganization.252 In this
plan, certain classes of creditors, including public employees with
these claims for prepetition breach of contract, may be impaired.253
As an impaired class, these public employees are granted voting
rights in deciding whether to approve the proposed plan of
reorganization filed by the municipality.254 Although it is preferred
that the impaired class vote in favor of the plan, a cram down is
available, where the court may impose the plan on creditors who do
not vote in favor of the plan.255 Because the cram down is involuntary
on the part of impaired creditors, the court must first make a finding
that the plan is fair and equitable.256 Once this finding is made, the
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court may approve the plan and the municipality may exit Chapter
9.257 The municipality must then fulfill its obligations under the
plan.258
Thus, municipalities may use the tools available in
bankruptcy to reorganize debt and better provide for their
constituencies going forward.
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